According to a secret U.S. document, the presidents of both countries had reportedly agreed that, with the exception of Lachin, Armenia would withdraw from all territories surrounding Karabakh.
The U.S. State Department has released classified documents regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict dating back to the late 1990s.
According to a report by "Radio Free Europe" from its Armenian bureau, the then-presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Robert Kocharyan and Heydar Aliyev, had reached an agreement in a one-on-one format, without mediators, on the exchange of Meghri for Karabakh.
The land swap option in Karabakh negotiations became known as the "Goble Plan," named after former U.S. State Department official Paul Goble. He was the first to propose this idea in 1992 during a visit to Karabakh, under the direction of then-U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, as part of a United Nations initiative.
Although Paul Goble did not hold a senior position in the U.S. State Department and his proposal did not have an official character, the declassified documents indicate that this issue was already being discussed at the highest levels behind closed doors in the early 1990s – not by Goble, but by the Turkish government. It is difficult to say with certainty who first brought up this option, but according to reliable sources, Turkish President Turgut Ozal presented this proposal to the U.S. President as early as 1992, one year after Armenia declared its independence.
According to declassified documents from the White House, Turgut Ozal stated:
"I have an idea: 80% of the population of Karabakh is Armenian, and 20% is Azerbaijani. They could swap territories: Karabakh would go to Armenia, and in return, a land area that divides Azerbaijan into two parts would be given to Azerbaijan."
It seems that the George H. W. Bush administration did not show much interest in this proposal. However, Ankara did not forget this idea and brought it back to the table during the presidency of the next U.S. president, Bill Clinton.
According to declassified documents from the U.S. Department of State, in 1997, Turkey's Deputy Foreign Minister Onur Oymen, during a phone call with U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, once again proposed resolving the Karabakh issue through "border changes."
"Oymen stated that he had discussed this matter with Turkey's former Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, and Ecevit had suggested a land swap: Azerbaijan would give Karabakh to Armenia, and in return, Armenia would cede certain territories to Azerbaijan."
Oymen added that Turkey had already discussed this issue with Russia and was seeking to understand Washington's position.
In response, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott stated that such an option would distance the conflict parties from the Minsk Group's proposals and would complicate the resolution of the issue rather than simplify it:
"Experience from various regions of the world shows that changing borders is like opening Pandora's box. In the case of the Karabakh issue, this approach would, at best, lead negotiations into a deadlock, and at worst, it could trigger a new wave of violence."
At the same time, Talbott emphasized that if Azerbaijanis and Armenians reached such a decision through negotiations without the use of force, then both the Minsk Group and the United States would support this solution.
However, the administration in power in Armenia at the time refused to discuss this idea. This is noted in a diplomatic telegram from September 1997.
According to documents, after the change of power in Armenia, the idea of territorial exchange entered the negotiation agenda thanks to the one-on-one meetings between Robert Kocharian and Heydar Aliyev. Prior to this, the stage-by-stage, package solutions and the "common state" model proposed by the mediators had been rejected by one of the parties. When the negotiations reached an impasse, Kocharian and Aliyev began to meet without mediators.
According to several confidential documents from "Radio Liberty's" Armenia office, American diplomats and their high-ranking counterparts report that as a result of these meetings, in September 1999, Kocharian, in principle, accepted Aliyev’s proposal for territorial exchange. According to American diplomats, this agreement was reached in the Sadarak section of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border.
The fifth meeting between Heydar Aliyev and Robert Kocharian in 1999 was one of the rare events, as after this meeting, both presidents publicly declared their readiness to compromise.
"Robert Sedrakovich and I are considering what mutual concessions we can make," said Heydar Aliyev at the time.
"Yes, I must note that we discussed the degree of compromises, meaning, as we say, the mutual steps to be taken in the negotiation process," Robert Kocharian added.
The presidents left the meeting in high spirits and even discussed how many sheep would be slaughtered when the final agreement was signed. However, they did not reveal exactly how the issue would be resolved.
The details of the matter became clear from a diplomatic telegram sent to Washington after the meeting. The telegram was prepared by the U.S. ambassadors to Armenia and Azerbaijan.
"Since the start of the conflict in 1988, the prospects for peace have never been as real as they are now. This has been made possible thanks to the efforts of Presidents Kocharian and Aliyev," the American diplomats noted.
The telegram further clarified this fact:
"In April 1999, at NATO's Washington Summit, President Aliyev put forward the proposal for territorial exchanges. President Kocharian, in principle, accepted this idea, and the two leaders entered an active negotiation phase based on Aliyev's proposals."
After the Sadarak meeting, U.S. Vice President Albert Gore sent a letter to the parties, praising the "important progress made through direct dialogue."
In his letter, the Vice President wrote:
"I understand that these negotiations entail serious concessions from both sides. However, I also believe that your decision to seize this unique opportunity is a wise and courageous step."
The U.S. President and Secretary of State then sent Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott to the region. He met with the leadership of Azerbaijan first, then Armenia, and later traveled to Ankara.
During his meeting with Turkish President Suleyman Demirel, Talbott expressed how excited they were in Baku about this agreement, mentioning that there was a possibility that "the agreement could be signed at the OSCE summit in Istanbul within a few weeks." He even asked for time to be set aside in the U.S. President and Secretary of State's schedules for a possible signing ceremony.
However, while Strobe Talbott was still in the region, the assassinations in the Armenian parliament on October 27, 1999, completely shifted the political landscape. Prime Minister Vazgen Sarkisyan, Parliament Speaker Karen Demirchyan, and six other senior officials were killed. Within just a few hours, Armenia's political scene was radically altered, and this not only affected the country's future but also had significant consequences on the agreements reached regarding Meghri.
Some diplomatic documents contain important details related to these events.
In a confidential telegram sent by the U.S. Co-Chair of the Minsk Group, Kerry Cavanaugh, it was noted that on the afternoon of October 27, Prime Minister Vazgen Sarkisyan had expressed his support for the agreement between Kocharian and Aliyev at the presidential residence. However, according to another document, when Talbott arrived in Ankara later that evening, he told President Suleyman Demirel that he was not fully informed about Sarkisyan and Kocherian's plans:
“The Deputy Secretary of State informed President Demirel that during his meeting with Kocharian, Prime Minister Vazgen Sarkisyan had heard some of the details of the Kocharian-Aliyev talks for the first time.”
Although the specific details Talbott referred to were not outlined in the telegram, he informed Demirel that Kocharian, unlike Aliyev, was behaving more cautiously and did not want to rush.
A few hours after the terrorist attack in the parliament, the Deputy Secretary of State sent the following message to President Demirel:
“One of the reasons for Kocharian's cautious behavior is that he does not know whether Moscow is fully aware of the progress he and Aliyev have made. He is preparing to meet with Boris Yeltsin on November 5 to discuss this matter. Kocharian is concerned about the impression that might be created in Moscow that he and/or the Americans are working behind the Russians' back.”
During this discussion, Telbott emphasized that both Aliyev and Kocharyan had requested that the agreements they had reached remain completely confidential. Demirel assured that this information would not leave the room.
In that meeting, Kocharyan also brought up the importance of maintaining Armenia's trade relations with Iran:
“Kocharyan stated that Armenia wants to find a way to maintain important trade relations with Iran through dialogue with either Azerbaijan or Turkey.”
Demirel agreed on this issue and noted that Azerbaijan could find a way to ensure this. However, Baku had no intention of making additional concessions.
A few weeks after the Sadarak meeting, in November 1999, Heydar Aliyev sent a delegation to Washington. The delegation included Prime Minister Arthur Rasizada and Azerbaijan’s current president Ilham Aliyev.
The stenogram of the meetings held at the U.S. State Department reveals that the delegation came to Washington specifically to discuss the issue of territorial exchange.
"Aliyev and Rəsizadə stated that they had held positive meetings with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and that both organizations had openly expressed their readiness to provide operational support for the implementation of a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan."
At that time, İlham Aliyev reassured the U.S. side that Azerbaijan wanted to resolve the issue as soon as possible. He also expressed his concern, complaining that the opposition's rumors and suspicions were weakening the government's position domestically:
"Aliyev stated that the Azerbaijani people were becoming increasingly concerned. They understand that something is happening, but they are not informed about the details. Meanwhile, the opposition is speculating and taking advantage of the situation."
The Azerbaijani side believed that Armenia was carrying out Moscow's instructions to delay the process. However, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State rejected these suspicions and stated that the main reason was Armenia's internal political situation. According to him, after the October 27th terrorist attack, Kocharian needed to gain support for making bold decisions.
The U.S. Department of State’s confidential document describes part of the discussions as follows:
"Ilham Aliyev stated that he understands it is very difficult for Kocharian, who is of Armenian descent from Karabakh, to give up the Meghri region."
A few months later, this issue was discussed at the level of U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Ivanov. Albright tried to convince Moscow that this agreement was beneficial for the region's security. In response, Ivanov made the same argument, emphasizing that after October 27th, Kocharian’s political position had significantly weakened.
"Ivanov stated that he had discussed these issues at length with both Kocharian and Aliyev. Kocharian sincerely expressed the importance of ensuring internal stability before finalizing this agreement. He believes that he no longer has the same level of support as he did before the October 27th events. Despite the fact that this agreement would result in Yerevan gaining more territory, they believe that, in the end, they would be surrounded on three sides by Turks and their close relatives, and furthermore, the situation in Georgia is still unstable."
According to this agreement, the Armenian side was to withdraw from all the territories surrounding Karabakh, except for Lachin.
The former Secretary of the Security Council of the unrecognized "Nagorno-Karabakh Republic," Samvel Babayan, stated in 2019 that such a proposal could not have been discussed without his knowledge.
"After me, no one has conducted negotiations; we were supposed to leave the territories, but no one informed me about anything," he claimed.
However, documents from the U.S. State Department indicate that mediators also attempted to inform the unrecognized regime in Karabakh. In December 1999, approximately two months after the meeting in Sadarak, the Minsk Group traveled to Khankendi at the request of Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev to confirm that the Karabakh Armenians had agreed to this settlement option. A few days later, the U.S. Co-Chair of the Minsk Group, Carey Cavanaugh, sent the details of the meeting to Washington.
"Arkadi Ghukasyan immediately confirmed that he fully supported the Kocharian-Aliyev agreement, and I promised to convey this to the Azerbaijani president."
According to diplomatic telegrams, during that period, mediators were working with international donors to develop a plan for the reconstruction of the territories and the resettlement of people after the agreement was signed. The French co-chair of the Minsk Group even inquired about the most suitable time for the World Bank to conduct a visit to assess the region's needs. In response, Ghukasyan stated that the sooner, the better, while also assuring that he would keep the information confidential.
"He stated that he would maintain complete confidentiality, considering it vital to achieving a resolution. Concluding his remarks, he emphasized that the situation of Karabakh was unacceptable and could not continue for long, stressing the need for peace and development."
Diplomatic documents also indicate that after October 27, the President of Armenia focused more on internal instability and the need to secure the border with Iran, requesting additional time.
According to State Department records, by January 2000, during a private meeting with Aliyev in Davos, Robert Kocharyan unexpectedly presented a new proposal, which was unforeseen by Azerbaijan's representative and the co-chairing countries. Heydar Aliyev later informed U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan Stanley Escudero about this development in February 2000.
"Kocharyan, emphasizing the extraordinary importance of the Armenia-Iran border, proposed the transfer of Meghri and the loss of this border as initially agreed in Nakhchivan—on the condition that Turkey agrees to discuss the 1915-16 genocide," the document states.
Aliyev objected, asserting that the genocide issue had never been part of the Azerbaijan-Armenia agenda and that he could not raise this topic with Turkey. At the same time, this gave the American diplomat an opportunity to argue that the Armenian side did not consider the border with Iran to be of vital importance.
"If Kocharyan is ready to give it up in exchange for genocide recognition, then Meghri is not a matter of principle but a subject of negotiation."
Kocharyan’s actual attempt to raise this issue is further confirmed by a telegram sent by U.S. Minsk Group Co-Chair Carey Cavanaugh after his meeting with the former unrecognized "Nagorno-Karabakh Republic" president, Arkadi Ghukasyan.
"After receiving information over the phone from Yerevan, Ghukasyan reiterated Kocharyan’s arguments and stated that time was needed until Armenia could force Turkey to acknowledge Armenians’ concerns about the genocide," the telegram states.
However, in the same document, the American co-chair noted that the Armenian calculations were baseless and mistaken. "The Turks will go no further than promising to open borders and establish relations."
The same message was conveyed by U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright during her meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Ivanov in Moscow on February 1, 2000.
"The Secretary of State said she had conveyed to Aliyev and Kocharyan that they must not miss the opportunity to achieve peace. Ankara is now pursuing a more open and supportive policy, but it will never go as far as apologizing for what the Armenians obsess over—the genocide."
During the 2021 election campaign, Robert Kocharyan stated that he had described how the Meghri issue was discussed very clearly in his book.
However, his autobiography does not mention behind-the-scenes negotiations or deals. Kocharyan has emphasized one point both in the 2000s and after leaving office: the Minsk Group never proposed such an exchange.
"There were three proposals: 'Common State' (1998), Key West (which Aliyev rejected), and the Madrid Principles."
On paper, there may have been three options, but the fact remains that between the first proposal in 1998 and the Key West proposal in 2001, Kocharyan and Aliyev held at least ten one-on-one meetings without intermediaries.
Declassified documents confirm that they discussed their own version of territorial exchange and its modifications.
The U.S. had predicted that Kocharyan would wait for Putin’s possible victory in the 2000 Russian elections. However, Kocharyan himself consistently stated from the beginning that he categorically rejected the idea of territorial exchange.
Initially, only the American side was aware of the negotiations, but months later, this agreement was already being discussed in official meetings of the three Minsk Group co-chair countries. For instance, in March 2000, a delegation of American diplomats led by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott met with Gérard Errera, the Director for Political Affairs at the French Foreign Ministry, and among other topics, this issue was also discussed.
"Special envoy Steve Sestanovich called on the Minsk Group co-chairs to meet with relevant international actors in Geneva in April to organize a mission to assess the settlement and reconstruction needs in the region. Sestanovich noted that Kocharyan clearly wants to resolve the issue. Herrera responded that aside from the issue of relations with Iran, this agreement aligns with his interests."
A few years ago, Robert Kocharyan also claimed that during his presidency, Turkey was not involved in this issue.
However, this was not the case. Turkey was involved from the very beginning. Behind closed doors, Ankara proposed the idea of territorial exchange as early as 1992. Moreover, during Kocharyan’s presidency, Ankara was aware of and closely monitoring his one-on-one negotiations with Heydar Aliyev. For instance, in 1999, the Turkish president directly told the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State that he was working behind the scenes with Heydar Aliyev and advising him.
"Demirel said that it would be difficult for both leaders to 'sell' such an agreement to their capitals, and he advised Aliyev to present the proposal from the two presidents to the Minsk Group, so that both parliaments would accept it as a proposal from the Minsk Group."
In the spring of 2000, the U.S. special envoy Sestanovich expressed that Kocharyan placed great importance on the upcoming presidential elections in Russia and wanted to move forward after Putin's expected victory.
However, Armenia's second president, both at that time and many years later, insisted that he had categorically rejected the idea of territorial exchanges from the very beginning.
"Here, only communication issues were being discussed; the territorial exchange option was never on the table. For example, the principle was discussed: could territorial exchange be accepted? You answer 'no' because the strategic border with Iran is lost. And that's it, the issue is closed. I am not exchanging land with Armenia’s land," he stated in an interview with a television channel on February 16, 2008.
However, the question remains: if such an issue was never discussed, why did the Armenian side later look for excuses to justify its refusal? The American side was informed about such a conversation in February 2000 by Grigory Berdennikov, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister, after his visits to Baku and Yerevan.
“Kocharyan told him that if Demirchiyan and Sarkisyan had been alive, he could have moved this agreement forward, but without them, it was not possible. The criticism of the agreement came from the right wing of the political spectrum and supporters of the former president Ter-Petrosyan. Berdennikov also said that Kocharyan told him that if there had been an Iranian connection along the border, he could have concluded the agreement; otherwise, it was of no importance. As for Turkey, Kocharyan said he was using Turkey's refusal to discuss the genocide as an excuse to reject the agreement with Baku.”
However, the question remains: if such an issue was never discussed, why did the Armenian side later look for excuses to justify its refusal? The American side was informed about such a conversation in February 2000 by Grigory Berdennikov, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister, after his visits to Baku and Yerevan.
“Kocharyan told him that if Demirchiyan and Sarkisyan had been alive, he could have moved this agreement forward, but without them, it was not possible. The criticism of the agreement came from the right wing of the political spectrum and supporters of the former president Ter-Petrosyan. Berdennikov also said that Kocharyan told him that if there had been an Iranian connection along the border, he could have concluded the agreement; otherwise, it was of no importance. As for Turkey, Kocharyan said he was using Turkey's refusal to discuss the genocide as an excuse to reject the agreement with Baku.”
At the same time, when high-ranking diplomats from the co-chairing countries were discussing in Washington, Paris, and Moscow why Kocharyan had backed away from the initial agreements, Armenia's foreign minister insisted in Yerevan:
"The proposal for territorial exchange was raised, but the Armenian side did not accept it and did not officially record it."
Exactly 25 years later, earlier this year, Vardan Oskanyan finally admitted that the Armenian side had been working in this direction.
"This proposal came from Aliyev during the Geneva meeting in 1999. Kocharyan, Vazgen, and I were present at this meeting, but the discussion was held one-on-one, and Vazgen and I did not participate. When Kocharyan came out of the meeting, he said that Aliyev had made such a proposal. Our initial reaction was: Aliyev is ready to give up on Karabakh, so the focus shifted to that. At that time, as foreign minister, I had clear instructions from Kocharyan and Vazgen Sargsyan—to try to take advantage of Aliyev’s readiness to hand over Karabakh without giving up an inch of Armenian territory. This process eventually led us to Key West," Oskanyan says.
According to information obtained from diplomats, the modified version of the agreement initially reached in Sədərək was already on the table as part of the Key West proposal. Under this version, instead of handing over Meghri, "sovereign corridors" would be provided to Azerbaijan for establishing a connection with Nakhchivan. According to the International Crisis Group, in 2005, the Armenian authorities in Yerevan showed them an unofficial draft of this agreement, which included a second clause stating that Karabakh would come under Armenia’s sovereignty. However, this document was never implemented. Before heading to Key West, Heydar Aliyev told the U.S. ambassador that he could agree to the deal only on one condition—if Nakhchivan were fully integrated into Azerbaijan.
"The President of Azerbaijan said that Kocharyan had proposed considering various options regarding the transfer of the Meghri region. In response, Aliyev stated that he could not consider any option that did not ensure the integration of Nakhchivan into Azerbaijan."
As early as 1997, during an interview in the United States, Heydar Aliyev claimed that the 46-kilometer Syunik territory, which separates Nakhchivan from Azerbaijan’s western regions, had previously belonged to Azerbaijan.
"After the USSR was established, Stalin gifted this territory to Armenia in order to divide Azerbaijan into two parts," he said.
Failing to achieve success in the 2000s, Baku revisited its demand to connect Nakhchivan with the rest of Azerbaijan via Armenian territory after the Second Karabakh War.
"It has been determined that the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic must be integrated into Azerbaijan. I insisted on this matter, even though it has no direct connection to the Karabakh conflict, but I am pleased that my demand was accepted," Ilham Aliyev stated on November 8, 2020.
It remains unclear how Aliyev managed to include this demand in the document finalizing the war’s conclusion or what closed-door discussions took place before and after.
Although the Armenian government has effectively agreed to the dissolution of the Minsk Group, the confidentiality of over 30 years of negotiations on Karabakh remains in force. In December 2024, the Armenian government responded to a request from the Armenian bureau of "Radio Liberty," stating that the documents are currently being inventoried and that their declassification is not yet up for discussion.
